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CITY OF BOERNE V. FLORES: A LANDMARK FOR
STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS
MARcI A. HAMILTON*
I. INTRODUCTION
As the representative of the City of Boerne, Texas in City of
Boerne v. Flores,1 the Supreme Court case invalidating the Reli-
gious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA or the "Act"),2 I
had the good fortune to discuss the Act with a wide range of
individuals in our society, including: members of the clergy, the
press, state and local politicians, a wide variety of legal and
theological scholars, lobbyists for a significant cross-section of
organizations, members of home-schooling, historical preserva-
tion, and Indian rights advocacy groups, and citizens acting
individually and collectively in neighborhood associations. I also
had the good fortune to argue the case before the U.S. Supreme
Court and therefore to converse with the Justices about the
Act-albeit in an undeniably brief period of time.
No matter how the particular individual felt about RFRA, and
no matter the forum, one aspect of RFRA's enactment intrigued
the speaker: RFRA was passed by an overwhelming majority in
Congress' and was supported by an unprecedented and massive
coalition of organized religions.4 I was frequently asked, "Don't
* Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. Copyright © 1997
Marci A. Hamilton. I would like to thank Hans Linde, Henry Monaghan, Chip Lupu,
Elizabeth Garrett, and Rebecca Brown for their comments on earlier drafts and Erin
McGahey for her research assistance.
1. 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1994).
3. RFRA was passed by a unanimous House voice vote and a nearly unanimous
Senate. See 139 CONG. REC. S14471 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1993); 139 CONG. REC. H2363
(daily ed. May 11, 1993). Only three Senators voted against it (Senators Byrd,
Helms, and Mathews). See 139 CONG. REC. S14471 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1993).
4. The Coalition for the Free Exercise of Religion was formed for the purpose of
drafting, lobbying for, and defending RFRA. Its members include American Baptist
Churches USA, American Jewish Committee, American Muslim Council, Church of
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the numbers bother you?" What they meant was, "Don't these
numbers make any constitutional difference, and shouldn't
they?" To varying degrees of success, I explained to my many
interlocutors that the numbers were not relevant to the constitu-
tional calculus and certainly not a good reason to suspend seri-
ous constitutional inquiry. The Constitution demands a repre-
sentative system in which representatives are supposed to be
independent of interest groups, no matter their stripe.' Political
pressure, even when exercised by organized religion, is no pallia-
tive for Congress; it is still beholden to the people to judge what
is in the country's best interest, and Congress is obligated to
enact only constitutional measures.6 I usually completed my ex-
planation with a reference to lemmings, saying the numbers in
Congress are surely more a testament to the power of Washing-
ton lobbyists for religion than to the conclusion that Congress
has acted within its constitutionally circumscribed role. In fact,
Congress transgressed constitutional bountdaries because it
failed to ask the most important constitutional questions.
Despite my certainty about the constitutional conclusions,
which was vindicated by the Court's opinion in Flores, I must
admit that the day I received twenty amicus briefs written in
favor of my client's opponent Archbishop Flores,7 many of which
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, Church of Scientology International, Episcopal
Church, Evangelical Lutheran Church in America, National Sikh Center, Native
American Church of North America, and Presbyterian Church (USA) (Washington Of-
fice). See Religious Freedom In the Dock, 114 THE CHRISTIAN CENTURY 237, 237-38
(1997); Responding to Constitutional Challenges, Diverse Coalition Launches Defense
of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Aug. 19, 1994, available in
LEXIS, News Library, USNWR File.
5. See Marci A. Hamilton, Discussion and Decisions: A Proposal to Replace the
Myth of Self-Rule with an Attorneyship Model of Representation, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV.
477, 481, 521-24, 528-29, 537-38 (1994).
6. See id. at 480-81 (discussing the unacceptable effect of interest group politics
on the representation of constituents).
7. See Brief of the National Committee for Amish Religious Freedom as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Respondent, City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997)
(No. 95-2074); Brief of American Center for Law and Justice as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Respondent, Flores (No. 95-2074); Brief of Senators Edward M. Kennedy,
et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Flores (No. 95-2074); Brief of De-
fenders of Property Rights as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent, Flores (No.
95-2074); Brief of National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation, Inc. as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Respondent, Flores (No. 95-2074); Brief of the NAACP Legal
[Vol. 39:699700
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were penned by notable representatives of time-honored reli-
gions,' and the Catholic Church's brief by the eminent law
professor and religious scholar Douglas Laycock, it occurred to
me that perhaps I should start caring, or at least craft a more
detailed apologetic of my view that the number of supporters in
Congress or in the world of religion is not constitutionally signif-
icant. Hence, this Essay.
Principles of the Constitution's structure-the separation of
congressional from judicial powers and federal from state law-
making authority-felled RFRA' Congress and its advisors
missed these vital structural issues when they considered
RFRA.10 In fact, a reading of the Congressional Research
Service's (CRS) reports to Congress or the majority of the testi-
Defense and Education Fund, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents,
Flores (No. 95-2074); Brief of the Minnesota Family Council, et al. as Amici Curiae
in Support of Respondents, Flores (No. 95-2074); Brief of ABA as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Respondents, Flores (No. 95-2074); Brief of the Becket Fund For Religious
Liberty as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent, Flores (No. 95-2074); Brief of
the National Jewish Commission on Law and Public Affairs as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Respondents, Flores (No. 95-2074); Brief of the United States Catholic
Conference, et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of the Respondent, Flores (No. 95-
2074); Brief of the Knights of Columbus as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Respon-
dent, Flores (No. 95-2074); Brief of the Prison Fellowship Ministries and the Aleph
Institute as Amici Curiae in Support of the Respondents, Flores (No. 95-2074); Brief
of Members of the Virginia House of Delegates and the Virginia Senate as Amici
Curiae in Support of Respondents, Flores (No. 95-2074); Brief of the States Mary-
land, et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, Flores (No. 95-2074); Brief of
the Commonwealth of Virginia as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent Flores (No.
95-2074); Brief of the Coalition for the Free Exercise of Religion as Amicus Curiae
in Support of Respondents, Flores (No. 95-2074); Brief of the Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-Day Saints as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, Flores, (No. 95-
2074); Brief of U.S. Senators Orrin G. Hatch, et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents, Flores (No. 95-2074); Brief of The Rutherford Institute as Amicus Curi-
ae in Support of Respondent, Flores (No. 95-2074).
8. See supra note 7.
9. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2172 (holding that the statute is beyond congressio-
nal authority in reference to the balance of powers). The Court engaged in structural
analysis whenever it asks the categorical question whether the entity that has exer-
cised power has done so within the boundaries of its constitutionally circumscribed
powers. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2376, 2383 (1997) (citing
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 187 (1992)); Plant v. Spendthrift Farm,
Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 239 (1995) ("[T]he doctrine of separation of powers is a structural
safeguard .... ").
10. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2172 (rejecting the statute because the faults in the
structuring of the legislation).
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mony before Congress would not have disclosed that these
fundamental constitutional issues were relevant.1
The Court's decision invalidating the Act is a sterling example
of the sturdiness of the Constitution's structure and, indeed, of
the Court in the face of immense and impressive political pres-
sure. 2 Without question, Flores is a landmark decision and
grandly illustrates that the constitutional structure of represen-
tative democracy is not premised on the inevitability of interest
group rule but rather exerts an independent force against inter-
est group domination.'" The Act's invalidation is the best histori-
cal example we have to refute the notion that interest group pol-
itics determine the outcome of policy debates in this society.
Powerful and respectable lobbyists may have pushed for RFRA,
but they did not prevail when the resulting law was an insult to
the Constitution's design."' Because of the entrenched structure
that the Constitution imposes on our republic, the Court was
able to issue an opinion devoid of vitriol, even matter-of-fact in
its tone, and to defeat with equanimity one of the most imposing
organizations of religion in history. 5 That is good news for the
Constitution, the Court, and the people.
Once the Constitution's Framers committed themselves to
expanding the power of the national government in the wake of
11. See infra notes 38, 44-46 and accompanying text.
12. See Ruth Marcus, Reins on Religious Freedom?, WASH. POST, Mar. 9, 1991, at
Al; Gustav Niebuhr, Disparate Groups Unite Behind Civil Rights Bill on Religious
Freedom, WASH. POST, Oct. 16, 1993, at A7; Gustav Niebuhr, Forming Earthly Alli-
ances to Defend God's Kingdom, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1994, § 4, at 5; Larry Witham,
Religious Freedom Bill Passed by Senate, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1993, at A5.
13. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text; see also Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2172
(holding the Act unconstitutional).
14. Cf Marci A. Hamilton, The Constitution's Pragmatic Balance of Power Between
Church and State, NEXUS: A J. OF OPINION, Fall 1997, at 33, 36-38 [hereinafter
Hamilton, Pragmatic Balance of Power] (discussing religious entities acting as inter-
est groups); Marci A. Hamilton, Religion's reach, 114 THE CHRISTIAN CENTURY, 644,
644-45 (1997) [hereinafter Hamilton, Religion's reach] (discussing the same). See gen-
erally Lee Epstein, Interest Group Litigation During the Rehnquist Court Era, 9 J.L.
& POL. 639, 685 (1993) (depicting amicus curiae participation in the area of reli-
gious rights).
15. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2172 (holding the Act unconstitutional in reference to
the Constitution's establishment of separation of powers and federal balance, and
thereby creating a stable foundation behind a decision surrounding an emotionally
laden issue).
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the failure of the Articles of Confederation, they focused on the
question of how to harness the federal government's newly creat-
ed power to best serve the interests of the people and the
states.16 Providing meaningful power to the federal government
occasioned the need for limits on that power, and the Framers
concocted a wide variety of means to exercise, but also to rein in
that power."7
The Supreme Court's decision in Flores reaffirms the Consti-
tutional Convention's simultaneous faith in and distrust of na-
tional power. As such, it offers at least a partial blueprint for
congressional accountability and a testimony to the strength of
structural analysis at the end of the twentieth century.
The modern Supreme Court has made a public and self-con-
scious effort to distance itself from policy disputes both in na-
tional and in state issues."s Social policy is the bailiwick of leg-
islatures and executives, not judges. 9 As the Court has
distanced itself from judging legislative conclusions about policy
disputes, it has become passionate about delineating structural
limitations on the operation of Congress. 0
16. See JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787 28-33 (Ohio Univ. Press 1966) (1840) (describing resolutions introduced by
Edmund Randolph); id. at 163-64 (discussing statements of James Wilson regarding
the balance of power between the general government and the states); id. at 187
(discussing the remarks of General Charles Pinckney concerning the general and
state Governments); id. at 255 (quoting Gouverneur Morris's opinion that "[the new
government] ought in the first quality to protect individuals; in the second, the
States").
17. See generally U.S. CONST. (enumerating legislative, executive, and judicial pow-
ers). The concepts of bicameralism, federalism, and state sovereignty are all central
to maintaining the checks and balances between the branches and between the fed-
eral and state sovereigns.
18. See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963); United States v. Carolene
Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379,
398 (1937) (citing Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537-38 (1934)); see also
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 862 (1992) (referring to the constitution-
al principles announced by the Court in West-Coast Hotel).
19. See Ferguson, 372 U.S. at 731 ("We refuse to sit as a 'super legislature to
weigh the wisdom of legislation.') (quoting Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., v. Missouri, 342
U.S. 421, 423 (1952)); Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955); see
also Hans A. Linde, Courts and Torts: 'Public Policy" Without Public Politics? 28
VAL. U. L. REV. 821, 854 (1994) (quoting Justice Ginsburg's statement that "in a
representative democracy important policy questions should be confronted, debated
and resolved by elected officials.").
20. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding legislation un-
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The federal courts' role policing the boundaries of legislative
and executive power is essential to the scheme contrived by the
Framers, which rests on the twin presuppositions that those
holding power will abuse it and that the exercise of power can
be stemmed by the exertion of countervailing power.2' The
courts' role within this structure is to interpret the lines drawn
by the Constitution and to invalidate excessive exercises of pow-
er for the purpose of balancing power within the society.2
In Flores, which invalidated RFRA on the ground that "Con-
gress... exceeded its authority under the Constitution,"' the
Supreme Court identified crucial means to define and confine
the power of Congress. The decision is not, as some would have
us believe, an expression of an utterly new constitutional direc-
tion,' but rather a pointed reminder of the Framers' carefully
crafted constitutional structure.
This Essay is an analytical exegesis of the Court's opinion
from the perspective of the Constitution's structure of govern-
ment, with special emphasis on the principles that encourage
legislative responsibility and accountability. The following dis-
cussion delineates three characteristics of an accountable and
responsible Congress that are central to the Framers' vision and
that were reaffirmed in the Mores opinion. First, Congress is
constitutional because it exceeded the power granted to Congress through the Com-
merce Clause).
21. See MADISON, supra note 16, at 63 (referring to Butler's concern regarding
abuse of executive power); id. at 135-37 (discussing similar views by Alexander Ham-
ilton); id. at 322-25 (referring to a statement of Gouverneur Morris that "[tihe Legis-
lature will continually seek to aggrandize & perpetuate themselves" and that checks
on power are the answer to this likely overreaching). The Court's eagerness to police
constitutional boundaries should not be overstated. It has been extraordinarily cau-
tious in reviewing congressional delegation of its power to the executive. See, e.g.,
Loving v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1737 (1996); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S.
361 (1989).
22. See Hamilton, Pragmatic Balance of Power, supra note 14, at 39.
23. City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2172 (1997).
24. See Protecting Religious Freedom After Boerne v. Flores: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House of Representatives Comm. on the Judicia-
ry, 105th Cong. (1997) (visited Nov. 1, 1997) <http'//www.house.gov/judiciary [herein-
after Flores Hearings] (testimony of Professor Douglas Laycock) ("Constitutional law
is changing, and what Congress has power to da based on past precedent it may not
have power to do after the Court's next decision."); id. at 7-13 (testimony of Mark
D. Stern, American Jewish Congress).
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given enumerated, limited powers. This simultaneous provision
and limitation of power is intended to ensure a separation of
powers among the federal branches' and a system of dual sov-
ereignty between the states and the federal government." This
is the enumerated powers doctrine. Second, Congress must
perform those tasks assigned to it reasonably well in order to
avoid other constitutional pitfalls. This is the proportionality or
means-end fit requirement." Third, Congress cannot unilater-
ally define its constitutional role. This is the principle of popular
sovereignty, wherein government power is derived from the
people rather than inherent in any institution. 9
I conclude that Flores turns on fundamentally structural is-
sues and that the decision should have come as no surprise.
Those for whom it did seem to have been wearing structural
blinders.
II. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IS A GOVERNMENT OF
ENUMERATED AND LIMITED POWERS
From many perspectives, the legislative process employed in
RFRA is a prescription for constitutional disaster. Congress rub-
ber-stamped the views of a powerful interest group, rather than
engage its independent judgment;0 it addressed an asserted so-
cial problem without ascertaining whether the problem in fact
existed;3' it imposed a legalistic formula to be applied to the
25. See generally LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AAERCAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 5-1, at 297
(2d ed. 1988) (discussing the limited powers of Congress granted by the Constitution).
26. See generally Thomas B. McAffee, Federalism and the Protection of Rights: The
Modern Ninth Amendments Spreading Confusion, 1996 BYU L. REV. 351, 356 (dis-
cussing the tension between the powers granted to the federal government and those
reserved by the states).
27. See generally TRIBE, supra note 25, § 5-2, at 298-300 (detailing constitutional
provisions that simultaneously grant and limit congressional power).
28. See generally id. § 14-13, at 251-75 (discussing the means-end fit requirement
when government regulation inhibits the free exercise of religion).
29. See generally Laura S. Fitzgerald, Cadenced Power: The Kinetic Constitution,
46 DUKE L.J. 679, 680-82 (1997) (asserting that the energy of the people "becomes
governmental authority by passing through the constitutional structure").
30. See Hamilton, Pragmatic Balance of Power, supra note 14, at 38. See generally
Hamilton, supra note 5, at 527-39 (discussing the duty of an elected representative
to exercise independent judgment while remaining loyal to his constituency).
31. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2169 (1997) (discussing the lack
1998] 705
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imagined problem without serious inquiry into the impact of
such a formula;32 it attempted to redress the imagined problem
in every forum and arena imaginable;"3 and it failed to inquire
adequately into the constitutionality of its own actions.' Flores
teaches that Congress is obligated to examine the constitu-
tionality of its enactments, and when it does not, "the presump-
tion of validity its enactments now enjoy," is brought into
question. 5
One message of the Flores decision is that Congress should
treat structural constitutional issues as threshold issues. More-
over, it ought to take the utmost care when it considers the con-
stitutionality of its actions when it is tempted, as it was with
RFRA, to abdicate its constitutional obligation to exercise its
independent decision-making authority and to simply follow the
lead of a powerful interest group. The near unanimous vote in
Congress, combined with the strength of the Coalition for the
Free Exercise of Religion, which drafted and lobbied for
RFRA,"6 are no excuse to attenuate constitutional examination,
but to the contrary should have sent constitutional warning bells
of information before Congress on the contemporary state of religious liberty).
32. RFRA provides in part:
(a) In general
Government shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion
even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except as
provided in subsection (b) of this section.
(b) Exception
Government may substantially burden a person's exercise of religion only
if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person-
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling gov-
ernmental interest.
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(a) to (b) (1994).
33. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-3(a) ("This chapter applies to all Federal and State
law, and the implementation of that law, whether statutory or otherwise, and
whether adopted before or after [RFRA's enactment]."); Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2170
("Sweeping coverage ensures its intrusion at every level of government, displacing
laws and prohibiting official actions of almost every description and regardless of
subject matter.").
34. See infra note 45 and accompanying text.
35. Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2172.
36. See David E. Anderson, Disparate Groups Seek to Protect Landmark Liberty
Law, SAN DiGo UNION-TREB., June 2, 1995, at E-5, available in LEXIS, News Library,
SDUT File.
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pealing through Congress. Especially when a bill touches upon
central First Amendment values and when the people cannot
grasp its content because it is written in legalese, members of
Congress are obligated to investigate with care their motivations
in the context of independent consideration of the Constitution's
requirement and the public's interest.
The advice rendered to Congress on the constitutionality of
RFRA was fleeting and incomplete, leaving the structural ques-
tions all but unanswered. The CRS rendered its verdict on
Congress's power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
("Section 5") in a mere paragraph, with the most erroneous clause
being: "[Tihe Supreme Court has repeatedly held that Congress
may use [Section 51 power to define and protect rights that are
more expansive than what the Court has held to be constitution-
ally protected."" Despite the separation-of-powers and federal-
ism issues raised by this sentence, the CRS did not consider these
issues important. It is not as though there was no legal precedent
that might have prompted such concerns. The very sources cited
in a footnote to the quoted sentence should have sent a signal to
delve more deeply into the structural issues presented. 9 For ex-
ample, Justice Harlan's powerful dissent in Katzenbach v. Mor-
gan0 should have raised some concern, as should the immensely
long set of opinions issued by a deeply divided Court in Oregon v.
37. While the Constitution directs Congress to consider the constitutionality of its
own actions, it does not prescribe particular procedures to that end. How to struc-
ture congressional deliberation to ensure more active and careful constitutional re-
view is an issue that deserves close attention. Cf Elizabeth Garrett, Enhancing the
Political Safeguards of Federalism? The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, 45
U. KAN. L. REV. 1113, 1183 (1997) (discussing procedural frameworks for congressio-
nal deliberation for the purpose of "vitalizing democratic decisionmaking").
38. This paragraph appears in two separate versions of the report. DAVID M.
ACKERMAN, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT
OF 1993: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 34 (1993) [hereinafter ACKERMAN, RFRA 1993]; David
M. Ackerman, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION
ACT AND THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ACT: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 30 (1992) [hereinafter
ACKERMAN, RFRA 1992).
39. Both Reports cite City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980); Oregon
v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970); and Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
See ACKERMAN, RFRA 1993, supra note 38, at 34 n.142; ACKERMAN, RFRA 1992,
supra note 38, at 30 n.129.
40. 384 U.S. 641, 659-71 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (discussing the federal
governmenVs limited powers).
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Mitchell.4 The voluminous opinions in Oregon v. Mitchell should
have made it clear that important constitutional issues regarding
Section 5 remained in flux. Moreover, what happened to the opin-
ion in EEOC v. Wyoming,42 wherein four members of a more con-
temporary Court cast doubt on the expandable rights dictum of
Morgan in an impassionate dissent that was not answered by the
majority?4" It is not mentioned.
In testimony before the House of Representatives and the
Senate on RFRA, a small number of individuals expressed some
concerns about potential separation-of-powers problems inevi-
tably raised by Congress's decision to overturn a Supreme Court
decision," but neither the CRS nor any member of Congress
pursued this line of inquiry." Professor Douglas Laycock was
41. 400 U.S. at 152-213 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); id. at 135-44 (separate opinion of Douglas, J.); id. at 118, 124-34 (Black, J.,
announcing the judgment of the Court); id. at 236-81 (Brennan, White, & Marshall,
JJ., dissenting in part and concurring in part); id. at 293-96 (Stewart, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part, joined by Burger, C.J., and Blackmun, J.).
42. 460 U.S. 226 (1983).
43. See id. at 251-65 (Burger, C.J., dissenting, joined by Powell, Rehnquist, &
O'Connor, JJ.).
44. See The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Hearings on H.R. 2797 Before the
Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
102d Cong. 380-86 (1992) [hereinafter 1992 House Hearings] (testimony of Professor
Ira C. Lupu expressing concern about separation of powers); The Religious Freedom
Restoration Act: Hearing on S.2969 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d
Cong. 124 (1992) [hereinafter 1992 Senate Hearings] (testimony of Bruce Fein).
RFRA was passed in response to the Court's decision in Employment Div. v. Smith,
494 U.S. 872 (1990), and for the express purpose of overruling it. See City of Boerne
v. Flares, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2160 (1997).
45. Only two scholars addressed the issue of Congress's power to enact such a
statute. See 1992 House Hearings, supra note 44, at 372-94 (testimony of Professor
Ira Lupu) (arguing that RFRA may be unconstitutional as applied to the states); id.
at 116, 124 (testimony of Bruce Fein) (suggesting that Congress may not have the
constitutional authority to enact RFRA); The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of
1990: Hearings on H.R. 5377 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional
Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 72-79 (1990) [hereinafter
1990 House Hearings] (letter from Professor Douglas Laycock) (arguing for the con-
stitutionality of RFRA as applied to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment);
id. at 51-52 (statement of Reverend John H. Buchanan, Jr., Chairman, People for
the American Way Action Fund) (concluding that Congress had the power to pass
RFRA in order to preserve the guarantees of the Free Exercise Clause); see also id.
at 56 (remarks of Reverend Dean M. Kelley) (responding to Representative Edwards'
question "Do any of the witnesses have a problem with Congress' right to enact this
legislation?" by stating "I have not been aware of anyone making that claim."); cf
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the most prominent legal academic asked to comment on the
propriety of enacting RFRA pursuant to Section 5. Like the CRS,
his letter to Congress on the issue failed to take seriously either
the separation-of-powers or the federalism issue.4
The enumerated powers doctrine has been at the heart of the
Court's structural jurisprudence. A line of modern Supreme
Court cases has emphasized the central importance of the enu-
merated powers doctrine, that is, the rule that the "Constitution
creates a Federal Government of enumerated powers. As James
Madison wrote, '[t]he powers delegated by the proposed Consti-
tution to the federal government are few and defined."47 Most
recently, in Printz v. United States,4" issued two days after the
Flores decision, the Court reaffirmed that the Constitution con-
fers "upon Congress... not all governmental powers, but only
discrete, enumerated ones."49
The enumerated powers doctrine is crucial to keeping in equi-
poise the various societal powers set in motion by the Constitu-
tion-the federal branches, the states, and the people. When
Congress fails to abide by its enumerated powers, it transgresses
important boundaries between the federal branches and between
the federal government and the states."° There is no vacuum of
power outside Congress's limited powers. Rather, when it ex-
ceeds its limited powers, it strays into domains reserved for
other branches, the states, or the people.51
With RFRA, Congress misjudged the scope of its power under
Section 5 and therefore simultaneously "contradict[ed] vital prin-
139 CONG. REC. S14470 (1993) (colloquy between Senator Hatch and Senator
Grassley). In addressing Senator Grassley's concern regarding congressional power to
enact RFRA, Senator Hatch responded that "Congress has power to regulate state
action under section 5 of the 14th Amendment." Id.
46. See 1990 House Hearings, supra note 45, at 78 (letter of Professor Laycock).
47. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995) (citations omitted).
48. 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
49. Id. at 2376.
50. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2172 (1997).
51. See id. at 2162, 2167, 2172; see also U.S. CONST. art. I (enumerating the pow-
ers of Congress); id. amend. IX ("The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.");
id. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectingly, or to the
people.").
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ciples necessary to maintain separation of powers and the federal
balance."52 In other words, by failing to hew to its demarcated
enumerated powers, Congress overtook federal duties more prop-
erly reposed in the Court and transgressed the line that separates
federal from state power. The Flores decision is yet one decision
among many in which the Court held that Congress cannot act
unless the Constitution permits such action by designating dis-
crete powers and tasks."3 Because only defined, and therefore
limited, powers are granted, the task of constitutional interpreta-
tion ineluctably requires not only defining what a branch can do,
but also what a branch cannot do.' Some exercises of power,
such as the enactment of RFRA, are simply out-of-bounds.55
The enumerated powers concept is not a modern construct,
but rather was central to the consensus reached at the Constitu-
tional Convention. 5 The resulting enumerated powers doctrine
undergirds the majority opinion in Flores." The opening para-
graph of the substance of the majority opinion began:
Under our Constitution, the Federal Government is one of
enumerated powers. The judicial authority to determine the
constitutionality of laws, in cases and controversies, is based
on the premise that the "powers of the legislature are defined
and limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken, or
forgotten, the constitution is written.""
52. Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2172.
53. See, e.g., Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2380-84; United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,
552, 566 (1995); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181-82, 187-88 (1992).
54. See generally Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2166-68 (discussing instances where Con-
gress has exceeded its constitutionally granted powers).
55. See, e.g., Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970) (invalidating Congress's legis-
lation lowering the minimum age of voters as an infringement on powers reserved to
the States); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (concluding that sections of
the Civil Rights Act of 1875 were unconstitutional because they sought to regulate
private conduct).
56. See MADISON, supra note 16, at 44 (stating that Madison "had brought with
him into the Convention a strong bias in favor of an enumeration and definition of
the powers necessary to be exercised by the national Legislature"); id. at 302 (refer-
ring to Gouverneur Morris's statement: "Let us know how the [Government] is to be
modelled, and then we can determine what powers can be properly given to it.").
57. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2162 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
137, 176 (1803)); id. at 2163 (citing Oregon, 400 U.S. at 128); id. at 2166 (citing The
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 13-14).
58. Id. at 2162 (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 176) (citations omitted).
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In response to those defenders of RFRA who claimed that Section
5 permitted Congress to alter constitutional rights, the Court
frankly acknowledged that congressional authority under Section
5 is broad, but "[a]s broad as the congressional enforcement power
is, it is not unlimited."59 This statement is not qualified by an
exception for near unanimous votes in Congress or legislation
urged by respectable and powerful groups. Rather, even when
both houses of Congress act in unison in response to a legitimate
and respected group, limits on federal power remain firm.
Federalism operates as a barrier to the congressional tempta-
tion to wander into general-unenumerated-lawmaking author-
ity. Echoing the Supreme Court's earlier statement in United
States v. Lopez6" that "the Constitution... [withholds] from
Congress a plenary police power that would authorize enactment
of every type of legislation,"6 the Fores decision stated that
the Fourteenth Amendment does not grant Congress the author-
ity to "legislate generally upon life, liberty, and property,"" but
rather limits Congress's power to remedying "offensive state ac-
tion, [that is] 'repugnant' to the Constitution."' The Religious
Freedom Restoration Act offends federalism because it "is a con-
siderable congressional intrusion into the States' traditional
prerogatives and general authority to regulate for the health
and welfare of their citizens."6 In other words, the enumerated
powers doctrine is intended to prevent incursions on federalism and
to force Congress to account for its actions in the text and design of
the Constitution.65
The decision in Fores proves that limitation of power is a con-
stitutional touchstone for the exercise of congressional authority
in every circumstance. Even when Congress acts pursuant to the
entreaties of powerful religious entities,66 the Constitution's cir-
59. Id. at 2163 (quoting Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 128 (Black, J., announcing judgment
of the Court and expressing his own opinion)).
60. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
61. Id. at 566.
62. Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2166 (quoting The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 15).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 2171.
65. See id. at 2164-66.
66. See Brief of the Coalition for the Free Exercise of Religion as Amicus Curiae
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cumscription of congressional power to a sphere of discrete tasks
still applies with force.
The majority opinion's final and summarizing paragraph rein-
forced the theme of meaningful limits on congressional power
with the observation that deference is due Congress, especially
when it engages its Section 5 powers, but its "discretion is not
unlimited,.. .and the courts retain the power, as they have
since Marbury v. Madison, to determine if Congress has exceed-
ed its authority under the Constitution."
III. CONGRESS'S ASSIGNED TASKS MUST BE PERFORMED
REASONABLY WELL
Under the Court's structural examination of Congress's exer-
cises of power, Congress is not only constrained to act within an
identified, enumerated power, but also must enact law that is
reasonably well suited to its ends: This proportionality re-
quirement is especially important when Congress is not in fact
remedying an existing constitutional violation, but rather at-
tempting to prevent a nascent constitutional violation. The
Court stated, "[wihile preventive rules are sometimes appropri-
ate remedial measures, there must be a congruence between the
means used and the ends to be achieved. The appropriateness of
remedial measures must be considered in light of the evil pre-
sented." 9 RFRA was dramatically out of proportion to its al-
leged justifications. As the Court noted, this wholesale alteration
in free exercise jurisprudence, which applied to every law passed
at any time, was erected on the flimsiest of foundations: a hand-
in Support of Respondents at 1, City of Boerne v. Flores, 73 F.3d 1352 (5th Cir.
1996) (No. 95-2074) ("[The Coalition] drafted, lobbied for, and ultimately secured the
passage of, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act."). There were six amicus curiae
briefs filed on behalf of traditional religious groups before the Supreme Court, gath-
ering support from over sixty religious and civil liberties organizations. See supra
note 7.
67. Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2172.
68. See generally id. at 2164 (distinguishing between the Congress's ability under
Section 5 to remedy unconstitutional actions and to make substantive changes in
governing law).
69. Id. at 2169. For further discussion of the proportionality requirement, see
Marci A. Hamilton and David Schoenbrod, The Unsurprising Proportionality Require-
ment in Boerne v. Flores (on file with author).
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ful of anecdotes and dated stories of religious persecution."
This disproportion signified that Congress had passed beyond its
constitutional boundaries.
Although the Court made clear that Congress was not required
to conduct certain hearings or to make certain findings,7 the
legislative record taken together with the Act revealed that
"RFRA is so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or preven-
tive object that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or de-
signed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior."7' Thus, it is not
enough under Section 5 for Congress to assert that there is a prob-
lem and that it has a solution.73 Congress bears a responsibility
to show to a reasonable degree that its solution is in fact aimed at
an existing problem.74 When Congress fails to embrace this re-
.sponsibility, it offends the states and the courts. This constrict
keeps Congress moored to its highest institutional competence
and its most fundamental constitutional obligation, the solution
of social policy problems by making hard policy choices. 5
The means-end requirement is a mechanism that operates to
keep an overeager Congress from transgressing the lines of power
drawn by the Constitution76 and is especially important in the
Section 5 context. As the Flores case illustrates, the Fourteenth
Amendment invites Congress to enforce constitutionally protected
liberties, but that invitation creates tremendous temptation to
define those liberties.77 When Congress reaches beyond its power
70. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2164.
71. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 497-500 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring
in judgment). In Fullilove, Justice Powell noted: "Such a requirement would mark an
unprecedented imposition of adjudicatory procedures upon a coordinate branch of
Government. Neither the Constitution nor our democratic tradition warrants such a
constraint on the legislative process." Id. at 503.
72. Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2170.
73. See generally United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 563 (1995) (holding that
mere knowledge of a problem is insufficient to support legislative enactment of fire-
arm restriction laws).
74. See id.; Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345 (1879).
75. See DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: How CONGRESS
ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION 10-12, 58-59, 72-75 (1993); Marci A.
Hamilton, Power, Responsibility, and Republican Democracy, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1539,
1542-47 (1995) (reviewing David Schoenbrod's book Power Without Responsibility:
How Congress Abuses the People Through Delegation).
76. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2169.
77. See Marci A. Hamilton, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Letting the Fox
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to enforce and, instead, embraces the power to define, it collides
with both the federalism and separation-of-powers limitations on
the congressional exercise of power. The proportionality require-
ment brings Congress back down to earth and its essential insti-
tutional competence, directing it to examine real social problems
and to construct "appropriate" solutions.78
IV. CONGRESS Is NOT PERMITTED TO ENGAGE IN SELF-
DEFINITION
The Constitution is the source of each federal branch's param-
eters, which is to say that the branches may not independently
define their powers.79 In Flores, the Court stated this principle,
drawing upon its holding in Marbury v. Madison, parts of which
I quoted in my opening statement before the Court: "If Congress
could define its own powers by altering the Fourteenth
Amendment's meaning, no longer would the Constitution be 'su-
perior paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means.' It
would be 'on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and, like oth-
er acts, .. . alterable when the legislature shall please to alter
it.'""0 The Court illustrated this point with the statement that
Congress's attempt to redefine the meaning of the Free Exercise
Clause in RFRA was aimed at "circumvent[ing] the difficult and
detailed amendment process contained in Article V."s'
Before Mores, many in the legal world overread the Court's
Section 5 jurisprudence to permit Congress to revise the meaning
of the Constitution," effectively giving itself the power to define
its powers vis-a-vis the states on an ad hoc basis."s As the Court
Into the Henhouse Under Cover of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 16
CARDOZO L. REv. 357, 370-78, 386 (1994).
78. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.").
79. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 945 (1983).
80. Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2168 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,
177 (1803)).
81. Id. at 2168.
82. See 1990 House Hearings, supra note 45, at 72-79 (letter of Professor Laycock);
Matt Pawa, When the Supreme Court Restricts Constitutional Rights, Can Congress
Save Us? An Examination of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 141 U. PA. L.
REV. 1029, 1053 (1993).
83. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2162-63, 2168 (discussing Supreme Court cases inter-
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stated quite clearly in Flores,4 this is a principle that pits the
Fourteenth Amendment squarely against Marbury v. Madison.5
Indeed, Justice Harlan more than once had warned that Section
5 was on a collision course with settled separation-of-powers con-
cepts.86 As it turns out, the expandable rights theory of Section
5 did not have nearly the head of steam attributed to it. W i t h
its decision in Flores, the Court elucidated the suppressed issue
in Section 5 discussions-whether the Fourteenth Amendment
vitiates or attenuates Marbury v. Madison when Congress acts
pursuant to its Section 5 authority. The Court rightly conclud-
ed that Marbury was not trumped by the Fourteenth
Amendment." Mores bore out Harlan's reading of the relation-
ship between Section 5 and the separation of powers and fully
vindicated his vision of the Fourteenth Amendment as providing
ample remedial power, but not amendment power.89
That this was an inevitable conclusion is made clear by the
Court's seven-to-nothing vote on the Section 5 issue.' The ma-
preting the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973 to 1973bb-1 (1994)).
84. See id. at 2168.
85. See Eugene Gressman, The Necessary and Proper Downfall of RFRA, NEXUS: AJ. OF
OPINION, Fall 1997, at 73, 78-81; William W. Van Alstyne, The Failure of the Religious
Freedom RestorationAct Under Section 5 ofthe Fourteenth Amendment, 1996 DUKE L.J. 291,
292-303.
86. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 152 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) ("From the standpoint of the bedrock of the constitu-
tional structure of this Nation, these cases bring us to a crossroad that is marked
with a formidable 'Stop' sign."); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 659 (1966)
(Harlan, J., dissenting) ("I do not see how [such legislation] can be sustained except
at the sacrifice of fundamentals in the American constitutional system-the separa-
tion between the legislative and judicial function and the boundaries between federal
and state political authority."); see also EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 262 (1983)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting). In his dissent, Chief Justice Burger stated: "I have always
read Oregon v. Mitchell as finally imposing a limitation on the extent to which Con-
gress may substitute its own judgment for that of the states and assume this
Court's 'role of final arbiter.'" Id. (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (citing Mitchell, 400 U.S.
at 209).
87. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2168.
88. See id. at 2172.
89. See id. at 2167 (finding that the Section 5 text does not give Congress the
power to decree the substance of an Amendment); see also Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 212-
13 (limiting congressional authority to legislate against actual invidious discrimina-
tion, not hypothetical situations); Katzenbach, 384 U.S. at 666-69 (Harlan, J., dis-
senting) (arguing that section 4 of the Voting Rights Act was not authorized by the
Fourteenth Amendment because it was not sufficiently remedial in nature).
90. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2162-68; id. at 2176 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justic-
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jority opinion on Section 5 was written by Justice Kennedy and
joined by a broad spectrum of Justices: Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices Stevens, Thomas, Scalia, and Ginsburg." Its rea-
soning also was joined by Justice O'Connor, although she dis-
sented from the Court's determination of the constitutional issue
in the absence of briefing and reargument of the vitality of
Smith. 2 Given the confidence with which many assumed that
Katzenbach offered Congress the power to define its own pow-
ers,93 one might have thought that any holding in this case
would result in a fractured set of opinions characterized by vitri-
ol. To the contrary, the Court's majority opinion, which stated in
no uncertain terms that "enforce" in the Fourteenth Amendment
means "enforce" and not "create," occasioned no swan songs, no
"liberty or die" dissents. One of the most remarkable things
about the decision is its calm tone and the brevity of both the
majority, the concurrences, and the dissents.9 In fact, the ma-
jority opinion is quite matter-of-fact in tone and not overly long.
Although Justices Scalia and O'Connor disagreed over the his-
torical record underlying the appropriate standard for free exer-
cise cases,95 the rhetoric of their exchange is nowhere near the
heated rhetoric to be found in the abortion cases or even the
Commerce Clause cases.98
es Breyer and Souter did not address the Section 5 issue. See id. at 2185-86
(Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 2186 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
91. See id. at 2160 (majority opinion); id. at 2172 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at
2172 (Scalia, J., concurring in part); id. at 2176 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
92. See id. at 2176-85 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
93. See Douglas Laycock, RFRA, Congress, and the Ratchet, 56 MONT. L. REV.
145, 155 (1995); Pawa, supra note 82, at 1032, 1060-62; see also Douglas Laycock,
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 1993 BYU L. REV. 221, 245-48; Rex E. Lee,
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Legislation Choice and Judicial Review, 1993
BYU L. REV. 73, 92-94.
94. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2160-72; id. at 2172 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at
2172-76 (Scalia, J., concurring in part); id. at 2176-85 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); id.
at 2185-86 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 2186 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
95. See id. at 2172-76 (Scalia, J., concurring in part) (arguing that Employment
Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), was decided correctly and was a valid interpre-
tation of the Free Exercise Clause); id. at 2176-85 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing
that Smith adopted "an improper standard for deciding free exercise claims.").
96. See Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2373 nn.4-7 (1997) (Scalia, J., for
the Court); id. at 2402-03 nn.1-2 (Souter, J., dissenting); United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549, 564-66 (1995); id. at 603-12 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 615-18 (Breyer,
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Interestingly, the Court, in its analysis of a law that implicat-
ed both separation-of-powers and federalism principles simulta-
neously, did not fall into the contentious 5-4 split that has char-
acterized its federalism decisions in the Commerce Clause are-
na.97 When federalism concerns were joined to the sort of bla-
tant separation-of-powers problem posed by RFRA, the Justices
joined forces in a no-nonsense way. In other words, one structur-
al problem engenders more soul-searching and closer votes,
98
but two structural problems engender certitude and confidence
in a decision to invalidate an act of Congress.99
The proponents of broad federal power under Section 5 have
been wearing structural blinders in the RFRA debate. Even after
Flores taught us that Marbury remained good law despite the
enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment,"' many argued that
Marbury did not provide a stronghold against congressional exer-
cise of power under the enumerated powers doctrine, and there-
fore RFRA is likely still constitutional when applied to federal
law.' This contention was and remains unsupported.0 2
J., dissenting); Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490, 527-31 (1989)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). In Webster, Jus-
tice Scalia opined that Justice O'Connor would have held restrictions on abortion
unconstitutional if they imposed an "undue burden on a woman's abortion decision."
Id. at 536-37 n.x (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(arguing in favor of overruling Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
97. See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2365; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 549-50; Garcia v. San Anto-
nio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 529 (1995); New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144 (1992) (six to three decision).
98. See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2402 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("I have found [these
cases] closer than I had anticipated.").
99. See, e.g., Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2172 (concluding that RFRA contradicts princi-
ples essential to maintaining separation of powers and the federal balance).
100. See id. (emphasizing that courts retain the power to ascertain whether Con-
gress has exceeded its authority under the Constitution); see also United States v.
Grant, 117 F.3d 788, 792 n.6 (5th Cir. 1997) (suggesting that Flores "arguably casts
some doubt on the continued viability" of RFRA as applied to federal law); Steckler
v. United States, 1998 WL 28235, at *2 (E.D. La. 1998) ("[Rlequirements of RFRA
remain in effect with regard to federal law and regulations"); Rivera v. Crossroads
Tabernacle (In re Rivera), 214 B.R. 101, 106 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that a
federal RFRA was moot following Flores); In re Saunders, 214 B.R. 524, 526 (Bankr.
D. Mass. 1997) (dismissing a Chapter Thirteen petition regarding tithing granted in
light of Flores); In re Gates Community Chapel of Rochester, Inc., 212 B.R. 220,
225-26 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that a federal RFRA claim was moot follow-
ing Mores).
101. See Flores Hearings, supra note 24 (testimony of Professor Douglas Laycock);
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RFRA exhibits its structural weaknesses even when one looks
at its application to federal law. The law is a slap in the face of
the Court, crossing separation-of-powers boundaries in an un-
apologetic fashion.' Indeed, the vast majority of the Flores
decision, as a matter of rhetoric and logic, applies as persuasive-
ly to federal as to state law.' °4
Section 5 was the constitutional hook on which Congress and
its advisors hung the Act.'05 Congressional interpretation of
Section 5 transformed it into a general lawmaking power so vast
that it would have permitted Congress, in effect, to define and
implement its unilateral interpretation of the Constitution. 0 '
The same tactic has been attempted with respect to RFRA's ap-
plication to federal law. In answer to the question of RFRA's
validity as applied to federal law, some have claimed that it is
id. (testimony of Rev. Oliver Thomas); id. (testimony of Marc D. Stem, American
Jewish Congress); id. (testimony of Charles Canady, Chairman of the House Judicia-
ry Subcommittee on the Constitution); id. (testimony of Jeffrey Sutton, Solicitor,
State of Ohio).
102. See Gressman, supra note 85, at 81-84.
103. See generally Gressman, supra note 85, at 73; Eugene Gressman & Angela C.
Carmella, The RFRA Revision of the Free Exercise Clause, 57 OHIo ST. L.J. 65, 67,
120-21, 125-27 (1996) (noting the indignation and unjustified interference of Congress
in passing RFRA); Van Alstyne, supra note 85, at 292-303 (interpreting Congressio-
nal understanding of Section 5 as misplaced, classifying RFRA as legislation Con-
gress may encourage, but not mandate).
104. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2162. Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy not-
ed that "the 'powers of the legislature are defined and limited.'" Id. (citing Marbury
v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803)). He further noted, "as the provisions
of the federal statute here invoked are beyond congressional authority, it is this
Court's precedent, not RFRA, which must control." Id. at 2172. Interestingly, the
Court granted, vacated, and remanded without consideration of the merits Christians
v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church (In re Young), 89 F.3d 494 (8th Cir. 1996), which
addressed the application of RFRA to federal law. Presumably, if Flores was limited
solely to state law questions, the Court would have denied Crystal. Instead, it re-
manded in light of Flores. See Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church (In re
Young), 117 S. Ct. 2502 (1997), rev'g and remanding 89 F.3d 494 (8th Cir. 1996); see
also Marci A. Hamilton, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act Is Unconstitutional,
Period, 1 U. PA. CONST. L.J. 1 (1998).
105. See Hamilton, supra note 77, at 368.
106. This point was made most clearly in the Respondent's Brief submitted on be-
half of the church, in which Professor Laycock argued that the proper test under
Section 5 is that any law passed pursuant to Section 5 authority must have only a
"similarly reasonable nexus" to the constitutional concern at issue. Brief of Respon-
dent at 25, Flores (No. 95-2074). As the City responded, this test knows of no limits
on congressional power. Reply Brief of Petitioner at 15, Flores (No. 95-2074).
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"obviously" an application of the Necessary and Proper Clause as
though that clause gives Congress unnamed powers in addition
to its enumerated powers. °7 There is nothing obvious about
it. 18 As the Court stated in Printz, a decision that rests explic-
itly on structural principles and the precept that the enumerat-
ed powers doctrine is central to structural analysis, the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause is the "last[] best hope of those who
defend ultra vires congressional action."0 9
The text of the Constitution makes clear that the Necessary
and Proper Clause is not an independent power inserted for the
purpose of vitiating the enumerated powers doctrine."0 Rather,
it is a clause that limits Congress to its enumerated powers"'
and elaborates on that enumeration by explaining that Congress
should have a fair amount of latitude to execute those enumerat-
ed powers."' RFRA's breathtaking scope-its application to ev-
ery law, every government, and every time period in American
107. See EEOC v. Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d 455, 469-70 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (upholding
RFRA as applied to federal law); Bonnie I. Robin-Vergeer, Disposing of the Red Her-
rings: A Defense of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 589,
677-78 n.358, 688, 714 (1996) (discussing the use of the Necessary and Proper
Clause standard to determine which federal legislation was appropriate to enforce
the Civil War Amendments); see also Thomas C. Berg, What Hath Congress
Wrought? An Interpretive Guide to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 39 VILL. L.
REV. 1, 62 n.274 (1994) ("Congress has power under the Necessary and Proper
Clause (art. I, § 8, cl. 18) to take steps to ensure that free exercise values are re-
spected in any Federal program."); Timothy E. Flanigan, Smith and Lemon: Carried
About with Every Wind of Doctrine, 1994 PUB. INT. L. iV. 75, 85 n.69. But see,
Hamilton, supra note 77, at 364-70 (arguing that the Necessary and Proper Clause
could not provide support for RFRA because without an enumerated power, Congress
lacked authority).
108. See Hamilton, supra note 77, at 365.
109. Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 1365, 2378 (1997).
110. See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 18 ("The Congress shall have power ... To
make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the
foregoing Powers.") (emphasis added); see also Gressman & Carmella, supra note
103, at 137-38 ("The Necessary and Proper Clause is not an enumerated grant of
substantive power to Congress.").
111. See Randy E. Barnett, Necessary and Proper, 44 UCLA L. REV. 745, 792
(1997) ("For the Necessary and Proper Clause can and should be viewed as creating
a textual limit on congressional power that served to protect these enumerated
rights from infringements.").
112. See Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995
Sup. CT. REv. 125, 197-206; Herbert W. Titus, The Free Exercise Clause: Past, Pres-
ent and Future, 6 REGENT U. L. REv. 7, 38-41 (1995).
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history-precludes straightfaced arguments that it could have
been grounded in any specific enumerated power, such as the
commerce, tax, or spending power."' If Congress is going to
enact a law regulating religious liberty, then it cannot act in this
essentially abstract, across-the-board manner, but rather must
ground the regulation in one of the existing enumerated pow-
ers."4 The structure, text, and history of the First Amendment
teaches that it is not an enumerated power, and thus the Nec-
essary and Proper Clause cannot be linked to the First Amend-
ment to justify congressional power to enact RFRA." 5
If RFRA's record supporting its Section 5 authority was
weak," '6 then its record applying RFRA to federal law is virtu-
ally blank."7 As applied to federal law, RFRA should not be
upheld, if for no other reason than to send a message to Con-
gress that when a law is unusual and the enumerated power
issue is opaque, Congress is constitutionally obligated to provide
at least a modicum of explanation of what power it believed
itself to be engaging."' "Congress normally is not required to
113. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2170 (1997) ("Sweeping coverage
ensures its intrusion at every level of government, displacing laws and prohibiting
official actions of almost every description and regardless of subject matter.").
114. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995) ("The Constitution cre-
ates a Federal Government of enumerated powers.").
115. See Hamilton, supra note 77, at 363. Incredibly, the only advice offered Con-
gress by the CRS on RFRA's application to federal law followed the cockeyed reason-
ing that congressional power to enact RFRA derived from the Necessary and Proper
Clause because it effected the enumerated power of the First Amendment. This rea-
soning was presented in a conclusory manner with no support. See ACKERMAN,
RFRA 1993, supra note 38, at 35; ACKERMAN, RFRA 1992, supra note 38, at 30-31.
That this was the only legal research advice rendered to Congress on the question
of the constitutionality of its realignment of church-federal relations and its decision
to overturn a Supreme Court decision is, in a word, scandalous. For further discus-
sion of this issue, see Hamilton, supra note 104, at 37-38.
116. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
117. The only time the issue surfaced before the Senate was on the day RFRA was
passed. Senator Helms expressed concern that RFRA would invite litigation from
those attacking state and federal laws on religious grounds. See 139 CONG. REC.
S14516 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1993). Concern was similarly expressed in the CRS report
prepared for Congress. See ACKERMAN, RFRA 1993, supra note 38, at 34; ACKERMAN,
RFRA 1992, supra note 38, at 30. For further discussion of this issue, see Michael
Stokes Paulsen, A RFRA Runs Through It: Religious Freedom and the U.S. Code, 56
MONT. L. REV. 249 (1995).
118. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 562-63 (1995).
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make formal findings""' regarding the basis on which it has
taken action, but such findings "would enable [the Court] to
evaluate the legislative judgment 20 regarding the basis for
action when no such basis is "visible to the naked eye."'2'
Mores affirmed the structural soundness of the Constitution.
Congress cannot singlehandedly amend the Constitution, avoid
Article V procedures, or transform remedial power into the power
of self-definition. One earmark of amendment is the attempt to
alter the balance of power between critical social entities across
the board.'22 That is in fact the job of the Constitution."
RFRA's reach reveals its deep inadequacies on this score.
In effect, Marbury and Flores, taken together, constrain Con-
gress to solve social problems within the parameters set by the
Constitution, to treat discrete problems discretely, and not to
paint with the big brush the Framers wielded in their efforts to
redraft the structure of government and society. The institution-
al competence of Congress demands focus on concrete problems
and concrete solutions,'M something sorely lacking in RFRA.
As the decision in Flores pointed out: Article V precludes Con-
gress from singlehandedly amending the Constitution.2 ' Con-
gress, which has no constitutional obligation to include every-
one-or anyone-in its deliberative processes, 7 is prohibited
from amending the Constitution by itself." The amendment
procedures are structured to alert the people and to slow the pace
of amendment.'29 The crucial constitutional value of ac-
119. Id. at 562.
120. Id. at 563.
121. Id.
122. See MADISON, supra note 16, at 33 (reporting resolutions proposed by Edmund
Randolph); id. at 339 (quoting Gouverneur Morris's statement, "Some check being
necessary on the Legislature, the question is in what hands it should be lodged.").
123. See id. at 341 (quoting Madison's statement, "We erected effectual barriers for
keeping [the separate branches of government] separate").
124. See SCHOENBROD, supra note 75, at 153-91; Hamilton, supra note 75, at 1544-47.
125. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2169 (1997) ("FRA's legislative
record lacks examples of modem instances of generally applicable laws passed be-
cause of religious bigotry. The history of persecution in this country detailed in the
hearings mentions no episodes occurring in the past 40 years.").
126. See id. at 2167-68.
127. See Hamilton, supra note 5, at 481-82, 521-22.
128. See U.S. CONST., art. V.
129. See MADISON, supra note 16, at 351 (quoting Gouverneur Morris's statement,
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countability is exercised through the tandem operation of Article
V and the First Amendment's speech and press clauses.3 0 If the
dramatic change in the law signaled by RFRA is to be accom-
plished, then it cannot happen in the backroom of a legislature
but rather must survive the crucible of public and press scruti-
ny.'3' RFRA was not subjected to ratification procedures, and its
legalistic formulation was impenetrable to all but an elite
group. 2 The Constitution's formalistic structure prevents Con-
gress from shifting the balance of power between church and state
in every circumstance, in the absence of public awareness and
debate. 3 3 For that reason, RFRA's invalidation is a victory for
the people.
The Flores decision is a strong message to Congress to act
with responsibility, accountability, and independent judgment.
IV. CONCLUSION
When asked whether the large number of votes for RFRA in
the Congress and its deep support among organized religions
should make a constitutional difference, my answer is "No."
When asked, "What went wrong?," my answer is, "Structural
blinders." Congress, and RFRA's supporters, seem to have asked
the question, "Wouldn't RFRA be a good thing for religion?"
without asking the question, "Does the Constitution permit us to
benefit religion in this way?""s Had RFRA been upheld, Con-
"Legislative alterations not conformable to the federal compact, would clearly not be
valid."); id. at 352 (quoting Madison's statement, "lIlt would be a novel & dangerous
doctrine that a Legislature could change the constitution under which it held its
existence."); id at 626 (proposal for Article V).
130. Cf Hamilton, supra note 5, at 523-24, 540-43 (discussing obligation of two-way
communication between the legislature and the people).
131. See supra notes 79-89 and accompanying text.
132. See Hamilton, Religion's reach, supra note 14, at 647-48 (responding to Oliver
Thomas, Liberty Lost, 114 THE CHRISTIAN CENTURY 646 (1997)).
133. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2168 ("Shifting legislative mAjorities could change the
Constitution and effectively circumvent the difficult and detailed amendment process
contained in Article V.").
134. Of course, the notion of intentionally benefitting religion is another of RFRA's
constitutional infirmities. See id. at 2172 (Stevens, J., concurring) (stating that RFRA
violates the Establishment Clause because it favors religion over irreligion). The
Court did not need to reach the Establishment Clause implications in Flores because
the Act was invalidated on structural grounds. If the Court finds it necessary to
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gress would have discovered that it had granted itself untold
new powers to define constitutional rights against the states and
to legislate on any issue involving the due process clause's "life,
liberty, or property."135
RFRA was the single most expansive exercise of congressional
power yet to be devised. It lacked any meaningful limitation on
its application to religion. Its logic, as opposed to its goal, could
never have been distinguished from any of a number of arenas
where religion is irrelevant. The structure of the Constitution
saved us.
address a case involving RFRA as applied to federal law in the future, then the Es-
tablishment Clause issue is surely to be a central part of that case.
135. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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